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Vanessa Lemm, Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy: Culture, Politics, and the Animality of 
the Human Being (New York: Fordham University Press, 2009), ISBN: 978-0823230273 
 
Vanessa Lemm offers up new interpretations of Nietzsche’s philosophy through an exami-
nation of his writing on the relationship between humans and animals.  Her main thesis is 
centered on the tension between “civilization” and “culture” present in many of his works.  
For Nietzsche, civilization arose out of the need to form collective groups for the protection of 
the individual.  Over time, however, civilization lost its life-affirming, innovative, and inspi-
ring qualities, i.e. its animality, and began to produce docile, servile beings.  Culture, on the 
other hand, served as counterpoint, reconnecting humans with their animality through its 
stress on creativity and an active engagement with life.  In doing so, it returned humans to an 
animal-like state of forgetfulness that allowed them to focus on the future rather than the past, 
enabling them to transcend to a higher state and become what Nietzsche termed “over-
human.”  Lemm examines these concepts through a discussion of the themes of politics, 
language, truth, and historicity in the philosopher’s work, concluding with a discussion of 
animality’s uses for the study of biopolitics.   
 
After outlining definitions of civilization and culture, Lemm, in contrast to previous works, 
argues that Nietzsche’s model of the overhuman can hardly be viewed as anti- or nonpolitical, 
as one’s return to a life-affirming animality brings forth a stronger consciousness of responsi-
bility.  Preoccupied with the cultivation of freedom, a return to animality thus subjects the 
institutionalized concepts of responsibility and liberty found in civilization to a sustained and 
radical critique.  The resulting struggle between the animality and the state ensures the contin-
uation of freedom and social responsibility, as well as the maintenance of free institutions and 
the creation of future generations of free individuals. 
  
Lemm then shifts to a closer reading of Nietzsche’s concept of culture.  Culture frees life from 
the domination of civilization by encouraging individual responsibility, in turn creating an 
aristocratic society juxtaposed to the degenerative effects of mass politics, which has sought to 
mechanize humans, ensuring their maximum exploitation by the reordering of their lives 
through ideology.  Nietzsche argued that these attempts at regimentation would eventually 
lead to a countermovement founded on the principles of culture.  However, Lemm is quick to 
note that although he placed primacy on the affirmative values of culture and its ability to 
penetrate civilization, Nietzsche acknowledged that civilization and culture are locked in an 
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infinite, dialectical embrace.  Culture must juxtapose itself to the morality of civilization, and 
though it will eventually overcome it, through its efforts it spends itself and gradually withers, 
allowing civilization once again to colonize the terrain left by its passing.   
 
The work then moves on to discuss the themes of gift-giving and forgiveness present in 
Nietzsche’s work.  For the philosopher, the act of gift-giving is animal-like in the sense it 
promoted the forgetfulness which would allow both parties to recover their instinct for life.  
By jettisoning the burdens of the past through a conscious decision to forget, both parties are 
then able to focus on the future, free from a legacy of trauma. 
 
This process is contrasted to the Christian emphasis on forgiveness, which failed to create a 
sense of reconciliation and perpetuated a cycle of revenge fueled by a fixation on past 
suffering.  For Nietzsche, the act of forgiving fails to bridge the gap between parties, as it 
creates a sense of moral superiority in victims by requiring them to set aside the trauma of 
their experience.  Furthermore, forgiveness generates a continued reliance on the state and 
Church as intermediaries in conflict resolution, tying humans closer to institutions of domi-
nation.  Here Lemm extends her investigation to the work of Derrida and Arendt, comparing 
their positions on the gift to those of Nietzsche.  She finds Arendt’s to be least influenced by 
him, in the sense that her notion of forgiveness relies on a confrontation with the memory of 
the past event.  In contrast, Derrida bases his interpretations of the gift and forgiveness on the 
relationship between forgetting and forgiving. 
  
This discussion is succeeded by a lengthy chapter on historicity that places animality and its 
life-affirming creativity at the center of Nietzsche’s On the Use and Disadvantage of History for 
Life.  In contrast to sterile “scientific” interpretations of history that are directed towards 
preserving the past and therefore weaken life, animal forgetfulness creates the illusion of 
eternity, creating a space outside of time, consequently disrupting memory and the pursuit of 
a clean, “true” past.  Forgetfulness drives history forward by redirecting humans’ focus to-
wards the future, providing the action that generates new beginnings.  Nietzsche termed this 
form of history “counterhistory.”  This type of historical thinking recognizes that the past is 
not truthful in an absolute sense, but open to interpretation based on a multiplicity of 
perspectives, generating creativity and freeing humans from the alienation caused by the 
scientific study of the past, enabling them to overcome their current condition.  Acknowled-
ging history as a creative endeavor places it on the side of life as a force that inspires 
humanity. 
  
Lemm astutely uses the prefaces of Nietzsche’s works as examples of the application of what 
she terms “artistic history.”  Added to all of his works from 1886 on, the prefaces were used by 
Nietzsche as a tool to confront his younger self and initiate a process of overcoming his own 
past as a writer.  This exercise fragments the perceived unity of his work and exposes it as an 
unfinished project that will always remain incomplete.  Instead, Nietzsche’s books will remain 
immortal in the sense that they are dependent on the interpretations of future readers.  This 
reliance on a myriad of constantly changing perspectives calls into question the author’s 
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ability to control one’s work, a point echoed by Nietzsche’s comments on the role of historians.  
Describing history as a form of haunting, he describes one’s encounter with the past as “a 
return to the past as much as a return of the past,” exposing mankind’s inability to control 
memory. (100)  Cognizant of the power of the past to influence the present, artistic historians 
seek to preserve only what is worth remembering about the past because of its ability to 
encourage future endeavors.   
 
The role of historians as “architects of the future” (100) is further extended in Nietzsche’s 
discussion of truth, language, and the use of philosophy.  He drew distinction between 
pictorial thought (Bilderdenken), thinking in images, which humans share with animals, and 
intuitive metaphor (Anschauungsmetapher), or conceptual thinking.  Expressed through the 
creation of abstract symbols, i.e., language, intuitive metaphors divorced humans from their 
animality, aiding the domination of civilization.  Nietzsche found pictorial thinking more 
useful, as it linked humans to animals, and therefore life.  Conceptual thinking was unable to 
link humans to life, because, due to its abstract and artificial nature, it had no firsthand 
knowledge of life to convey.  Furthermore, conceptual thinking’s claims to an absolute “truth” 
were invalid, as it’s truth was in fact always metaphysical and directed back towards itself, 
rather than towards the “pure, honest truth“ of the “thing in itself.”  The concept of “being,” 
according to Nietzsche, thus had nothing to do with life itself, but with humans’ own sense of 
self, which was then metaphorically projected onto other objects, imbuing them with a false 
sense of “being.”  In contrast, Nietzsche argued, images allow humans to access the world and 
its objects in a manner free from the influence of such anthropomorphisms, enabling them to 
view the world in its’ real form.  (120-121) 
 
Intuitive metaphors form an inherently unstable system, as their abstractions leave the 
supposedly fixed definitions they created open to dissolution.  This process could be enacted 
by pictorial images, which could form a counter language and infiltrate the system of 
metaphors and destroy it from within, dissolving its absolutes, forcing them into the flow of 
life, and hence returning language to an “honest” and animal-like, truth that challenges the 
hegemony of the version of truth espoused by civilization.  Philosophers play an important 
part in this process, as they are to act as artists in the service of life.  If truth becomes an 
obstruction to life, philosophers should seek out new, life-affirming truths.  By doing so, 
philosophy embraces its true calling, that of engaging in “great politics”; the creativity and 
freedom of culture. (149) 
 
Lemm ends her work with a brief discussion of Nietzsche’s contribution to the subject of 
biopolitics.  She links his work to what she terms an “affirmative biopolitics,” one based on the 
continuities between humans and animals, emphasizing “the project of cultivating inherently 
singular, non-totalizable forms of life.” (152, 154)  Such an endeavor in particular addresses the 
gap in Foucault’s work on resistance, as it links animality to creativity, allowing humans to 
cultivate their existence as living animals, counteracting totalitarian attempts to divide life to 
classifiable and controllable species. (154) 
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Nietzsche’s Animal Philosophy is an engaging and thought-provoking work that challenges 
interpretations, both past and present, that have cast Nietzsche as, at best, nonpolitical, and, at 
worse, proto-fascist.  Although the work suffers from redundancy in parts and could have 
been expanded its discussion of Nietzsche’s influence on the work of philosophers such as 
Derrida, Arendt, and Foucault, these cavils are overshadowed by the value of Lemm’s study, 
which convincingly reveals the positive political core of Nietzsche’s work and successfully 
moves it beyond his own epoch, highlighting its relevance for the twenty-first century.   
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